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Abstract: Decentralization of the Spanish welfare state has stimulated regional policy 
innovation. A ‘demonstration effect’ among all Spanish Comunidades Autónomas has so far 
acted as a policy equalizer. In Andalusia, where a strong sense of common identity is widely 
shared, the regional government (Junta) has implemented new welfare policies which have 
contributed to consolidate its institutional legitimacy. This paper reviews the process of 
decentralization in Spain. It concentrates on the ‘catching up’ quest articulated by Andalusia 
to gain a similar status and degree of autonomy as those achieved by the ‘historical 
nationalities’ (Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia). 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
In contemporary EU member states, spatial cleavages and decentralization have often been 
examined as responses to regional claims for autonomy. Modernising strategies by sub-state 
layers of government have found in the principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in the Treaty on 
European Union, a renewed impulse for the running of public affairs, and new opportunities 
for policy experimentation. There is certainly a case for sub-state units to become 
‘laboratories of democracy’. It has been claimed that the payoff from innovation exceeds the 
advantages of uniformity and policy diffusion has been underlined as a criterion: the greater 
the need for innovation (for example, a ‘new’ problem or solution), the greater is the rationale 
for that function to be provided by the sub-state government (Donahue, 1997). 
 
The political salience of sub-state regions and regional policy-making in the welfare realm 
has drawn growing attention to the inter-relationship of both fields of research: territory and 
welfare (McEwen and Moreno, 2005). Not so long ago, ideas, interests and institutions related 
to welfare and spatial developments were frequently regarded as contradictory or even 
incompatible with each other. Regional actors and mesogovernments have now gained 
relevance not only concerning culture and identity politics. They are increasingly regarded as 
optimal welfare policy providers as a result of the interaction of the processes of bottom-up 
globalization and the top-down devolution of powers.  
 
The problem of territorial equity and cohesion has been mentioned frequently in discussions 
of the ‘new regionalism’ (Keating, 1998), but there has been little focus on the regional inputs 
of the welfare state. Of particular relevance are those policies concerned with welfare reform 
and the weaving of ‘safety nets’ to combat poverty and social exclusion. Such areas of social 
intervention appear suitable to be run by mesogovernments, which can be democratically 
accountable for the implementation of means-tested programmes, and for purposes of 
optimising economies of scale (Moreno, 2003). 
 
This paper focus on policies of welfare reform carried out by the Junta de Andalucía 
(Andalusian regional government). It singles out policy innovation implemented in Andalusia 
in line with the preference for a public provision of services. Likewise, we discuss the pro-
active, credit-claiming attitude of politicians and decision-makers in a poorer Spanish region 
as Andalusia, often regarded as backward and lacking the human capital and managerial skills 
necessary to promote policy initiatives. 
 
We review, first, the process of decentralization in Spain and the role of the Comunidades 
Autónomas in social welfare since the inception of the 1978 Constitution. After identifying 
the ethnoterritorial mimesis, or ‘demonstration effect’, as a policy equalizer and an incentive 
for all Spanish Comunidades Autónomas not to be ‘left behind’, we concentrate on the 
‘catching up’ quest articulated by Andalusia to gain a similar status and degree of autonomy 
as those achieved by the ‘historical nationalities’ (Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia). 
We then carry out an analysis of the minimum income scheme designed, elaborated and 
implemented by the Junta de Andalucía, which illustrate the capabilities of this sub-state 
government for policy innovation in the welfare realm. A final section prior to the concluding 
remarks deals with financial matters and the aspirations of the Andalusia government for a 
higher degree of autonomy in expenditure decision-making. 
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SPAIN’S DECENTRALISATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE 
 
The Kingdom of Spain is a constitutional monarchy of seventeen Comunidades Autónomas 
composed of: (a) three ‘historical nationalities’ (Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia); (b) 
fourteen regions (Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, Cantabria, 
Castille-La Mancha, Castille and Leon, Extremadura, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia, Navarre and 
Valencia); and (c) two Spanish North-African autonomous cities (Ceuta and Melilla) (see 
Table 1 for basic regional data).  
 
The Spanish 1978 Constitution does not include the word ‘federal’ in any of its provisions, or 
in any subsequent legislation. However, since the beginning of the 1980s the dynamics of the 
Estado de las Autonomías (‘State of Autonomies’) are characterized by a latent federalization 
(Moreno, 2001). After 25 years since the beginning of the decentralization of powers, the 
Spanish ‘State of Autonomies’ (Estado de las Autonomías) has achieved a high degree of 
popular support largely transcending past patterns of internal confrontation (CIS, 1998, 2002). 
 
 
Table 1: Spanish regional data 
 
 
AUTONOMOUS 
COMMUNITIES 
 
POPULATION 
 
% SHARE OF 
SPANISH GDP 
% PER CAPITA 
REGIONAL GDP 
UE 
MEAN=100 
1998 2003  
Inhabitants %total Inhabitants %total 
1998 2003 
1998 
UE-15 
2004 
UE-25 
Andalusia 7,236,459 18.16 7,606,848 17.81 13.54 13.85   59   72 
Aragon 1,183,234 2.97 1,230,090 2.88   3.20   3.12   89 103 
Asturias 1,081,834 2.71 1,075,381 2.52   2.35   2.21   70   81 
Balearic Islands 796,483 2.00 947,361 2.22   2.32   2.22 126 115 
Basque Country 2,098,628 5.27 2,112,204 4.94   6.36   6.38   93 119 
Canary Island 1,630,015 4.09 1,894,868 4.44   3.85   3.91   79   89 
Cantabria 527,137 1.32 549,690 1.29   1.24   1.25   76   93 
Castille and Leon 2,484,603 6.23 2,487,646 5.82   5.83   5.71   75   89 
Castille-La Mancha 1,716,152 4.31 1,815,781 4.25   3.56   3.50   65   77 
Catalonia 6,147,610 15.43 6,704,146 15.69 18.52 18.25 101 113 
Extremadura 1,069,419 2.68 1,073,904 2.51   1.74   1.76   60   62 
Galicia 2,724,544 6.84 2,751,094 6.44   5.49   5.37   69   76 
La Rioja 263,644 0.66 287,390 0.67   0.76   0.75   92 108 
Madrid 5,091,336 12.78 5,718,942 13.39 17,13 17.41 103 128 
Murcia 1,115,068 2.80 1,269,230 2.97   2.38   2.46   65   83 
Navarre 530,819 1.33 578,210 1.35   1.71   1.74   95 121 
Valencia 4,023,441 10.10 4,470,885 10.47   9.64   9.72   81   91 
Ceuta and Melilla * 132,225 0.33 143,394 0.34   0.29   0.29   60   80 
Spain 39,852,651 100 42,717,064 100 100 100   82   95  
* Spanish North-Africa Cities 
Source: Own elaboration on data from the National Statistics Institute (INE) (http://www.ine.es) 
 
 
In Spain, social assistance is a regional power of ‘exclusive competence’ of the Comunidades 
Autónomas (art. 148; 1.20; 1978 Constitution). Powers concerning the basic legislation and 
the economic regime of the national Social Security system remain within the domain of the 
central administration. However, the Comunidades Autónomas may have executive autonomy 
over the running and managing of contributory programmes (art. 149; 1.17). As a 
consequence of the flexibility of the constitutional provisions, all Comunidades Autónomas 
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claimed in their Statutes of Autonomy (regional constitutional laws) a large number of 
services and functions concerning social assistance, social services, community development, 
social promotion and welfare policies in general.1  
 
During 1982-1993, the Comunidades Autónomas took the legislative initiative in their 
regional parliaments, and passed acts establishing regional systems of social services. The 
main concern for the Spanish mesogovernments was to request and receive as many powers 
from the central administration as they could be entitled to. They subsequently made 
extensive use of their constitutional prerogative for the purposes of institutional legitimization 
(Arriba and Moreno, 2005).  
 
An important agreement for social policy provision between the three layers of government 
took place in 1987 with the approval of the ‘Concerted Plan for the Development of the Basic 
Provision of Social Services by the Local Authorities’ (Plan Concertado para el Desarrollo 
de Prestaciones Básicas de Servicios Sociales de las Corporaciones Locales). This 
intergovernmental agreement has resulted in administrative co-operation between central, 
regional and local governments. The aim is to provide services at the municipal level for a 
variety of purposes, including: (a) information and counselling; (b) social and day care 
services for the disabled and elderly; (c) refuge for abused women, single mothers, orphans or 
mistreated minors, and shelter housing for the homeless; and (d) prevention and social 
insertion. This network of centres constitutes the basic level for welfare primary attention in 
Spain, and was supported by all Autonomous Communities except the Basque Country.2 
Annual financing of this Plan is met on equitable terms by the three layers of governments. 
This agreement was the first in a model of intergovernmental relations characteristic of the 
process of federalization in Spain. Its implications for other policy areas have been of no little 
significance. 
 
In the period 1994-2004, the Comunidades Autónomas that had previously received the higher 
number of competences (Andalusia, Basque Country, Canary Islands, Catalonia, Galicia, 
Navarre and Valencia) carried out extensive policy-making in the welfare realm. On 
identifying the patterns followed by those Communities when allocating responsibilities for 
welfare to the stakeholders in the different social domains (public, private, family and social 
network domains), a contrasting policy configuration has emerged. Andalusia, the object of 
our analysis, has made choices in social policy-making most influenced by the public sector 
and the family. Regional public institutions have played an important role in the development 
of social policy in Andalusia, but this is combined with a pivotal role played by the family in 
welfare provision and distribution, a feature characteristic of the Southern European welfare 
regime (Gallego et al., 2005). 
                                                 
1 The only social services which remained outside the jurisdiction of the mesogovernments were those of the 
National Institute of Social Services (INSERSO). However, during the 1990s the executive powers for the 
running of practically all INSERSO social services were also transferred to the Comunidades Autónomas. 
2 On the basis of their historical rights, the Comunidades Autónomas of the Basque Country and Navarre have a 
distinctive fiscal regime which enables them to collect their own taxes. Subsequently, they transfer a previously 
agreed quota to the central state Treasury as compensation for Spanish common expenditure, and to cover the 
costs of running those state administrative bodies located in the Basque Country and Navarre. As the Basque 
Country government did not want to accept categorical grants, which indicated how the money should be spent, 
it remained outside the Concerted Plan. The Navarran government join the Plan although in a testimonial 
manner. 
 
 4
 
Table 2: Territorial Distribution of Public Expenditure in Spain (%) 
 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 
CENTRAL 87.3 75.7 72.6 66.2 58.3 58.9 56.2 48.7 
REGIONAL 3.0 12.2 14.6 20.5 25.8 26.9 28.2 35.5 
LOCAL 9.7 12.1 12.8 13.3 15.9 14.2 15.6 15.8 
Notes: (a) During 1999-2002, strong regional increases corresponded to the decentralization of education and 
health powers to all 17 Comunidades Autónomas. 
(b) Spending on social insurance pensions has not been taken into account as it would introduce a bias 
were it to be included as a central government matter. 
Source: MAP (1997) for years 1981-90, and MAP (2002) for years 1993-2002. 
 
 
In general policy terms, the process of decentralization has allowed for considerable regional 
autonomy. If public spending is to be identified as a good indicator of the level of regional 
autonomy (Watts, 2001), then it should be concluded that the Spanish Comunidades 
Autónomas enjoy a much higher degree of self-government as compared to federated units in 
formally established federations in the world. Likewise, the extent of decentralized powers in 
Spain is illustrated by the percentages of public employees under the responsibility of each 
level of government: 25 per cent (central), 53 per cent (regional), and 22 per cent (local), with 
the balance shifting from central to regional administrations in recent years.3 The 
decentralization of welfare competences in Spain has stimulated policy innovation, with a 
‘race to the top’ that so far has minimized the alleged detrimental consequences for state-
national solidarity. As a result of the fragmented nature of the system of social protection in 
Spain, and the deep process of decentralization of welfare competencies, the central layer of 
government can be regarded as one playing a subsidiary role with respect to the regions in 
matters of social welfare (Arriba and Moreno, 2005). 
 
In political terms, the gradual establishment of the Estado de las Autonomías in Spain has 
generated a complex set of relations which can be explained as multiple ethnoterritorial 
concurrence (Moreno, 1995; Lecours, 2004). The rule of the ethnoterritorial mimesis, or the 
practices of policy equalization among the Comunidades Autónomas by means of imitation, has 
been the main factor responsible for ‘tuning’ the decentralization process in Spain. After the 
approval of their Statutes of Autonomy (regional constitutional laws), the ‘historical 
nationalities’ (the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia) aimed at replicating the powers and 
symbols of the Spanish central state (for example, establishing a separate police force, 
developing paradiplomacy activities and overarching public policies in nation-building fields 
such as those of education, health or media, and promoting external and ornamental signs such as 
the flag, the anthem). On deploying their political claims during the 1980s, a second group of 
Comunidades Autónomas with ‘catching up’ aspirations for home rule (Andalusia, Canary 
Islands, Navarre, and Valencia)4 attempted to ‘imitate’ the institutional outlook of the 
‘historical nationalities’. A third group of ‘late-comer’ regions in the home rule process of 
decentralization (Aragon, Asturias, the Balearic Islands, both Castilles, Extremadura, Murcia) 
                                                 
3 In 1999, the corresponding percentages were 41%, 34% and 25%, respectively (El Mundo, 16 August 2004). 
4 Already in 1984, Joan Lerma (President of the Valencian Government) considered that there were not three 
‘historical nationalities’, but six Comunidades Autónomas with different levels of powers: ‘... they are allowed to 
get to the same place, and in particular I have to emphasise that the legal treatment for Catalonia and the Basque 
Country is the same as that for Galicia, but also for Andalusia, the Canaries and for ourselves [the Valencians]’ 
(La Vanguardia, 16 April 1984). 
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struggled not to feel discriminated against by the achievements of those ‘early rising’ regions 
referred to in the second stage of the mimetic sequence. Regional ethnoterritorial mimesis and 
the practices of the ‘demonstration effect’ extended all over Spain including those 
communities with less well-defined ethnoterritorial identities. 
 
 
ANDALUSIA, A DISTINCTIVE QUEST FOR HOME RULE 
 
In the general process of Spain’s decentralization during the 1980s, the case of Andalusia is of 
particular relevance. Andalusian leaders and the population at large mobilised in order to 
achieve the same ‘fast route’ procedure and degree of home rule previously pursued by the 
three ‘historical nationalities’. According to the constitutional provisions, and in order to 
achieve a faster and deeper access to regional autonomy equal to that of the Basque Country, 
Catalonia and Galicia, a popular referendum was held on 28 February 1980 in Andalusia.5  
 
The outcome of the referendum ratified Andalusian popular aspirations for full regional 
autonomy. Moreover, it led the way for other regions in their pursuit for access to home rule. 
This development brought about a crucial element of heterogeneity that contested the idea of 
considering asymmetry in the Spanish devolutionary process as a function of sub-state 
nationalism (Beramendi and Máiz, 2004). This view had been implicitly defended by some 
Catalan and Basque nationalists: i.e. implementing political decentralization only in the 
Spanish ‘historical nationalities’ while the rest of the regions would merely be granted 
administrative decentralization. Since then, nationalist parties in the three ‘historical 
nationalities’ have tried to establish a ‘political differential’ with respect to the rest of the 
Comunidades Autónomas, which they regard as mere ‘regions’. In turn, political formations in 
the regions have rejected the idea of granting privileges to the ‘historical nationalities’ and 
have resisted pressure to conform to a lower level of political autonomy.  
 
Certainly, the nationalist PSA/PA (Partido Socialista de Andalucía/Partido Andalucista) and 
the Andalusian Communists and Radical Leftists (Partido Comunista de Andalucía/Izquierda 
Unida Los Verdes-Convocatoria por Andalucía) have had considerable political input in 
claiming a higher degree of self-government, but the role played by the Andalusian 
Federation of the PSOE can be singled out as crucial in the development of the home rule 
process. The case of Andalusia shows how a hegemonic non-nationalist party with a strong 
regionalist agenda can press effectively for political autonomy at sub-state level, while 
maintaining its channels of influence at the core of the national political system. 
 
On claiming higher degrees of self-government, identity politics constitute a powerful 
instrument for political mobilization in all Spanish Comunidades Autónomas. In Andalusia 
there is a strong sense of collective identity. A mutual sense of belonging is shared by a large 
majority of the population based upon a secular and powerful culture. The intense 
mobilization prior to the 1980 referendum was the expression not only of a re-assertion of 
regional pride, but also of a refusal to be considered ‘less’ than Basques, Catalans or 
Galicians. As evident in Table 3, Andalusians’ strong sub-state identity and culture coincides 
                                                 
5 The referendum was held after 97% of Andalusian towns and eight provincial councils had decided to pursue 
autonomy according to the provisions of art. 151 of the 1978 Constitution. The 64% turnout rate was considered 
high. However, the rules stipulated that a ‘yes’ vote required the endorsement of more than 50% of the registered 
votes in each of the eight Andalusian provinces. The results were somewhat controversial because, despite the 
considerable support for autonomy in Andalusia as a whole, in the province of Almería, only 47% of the 
inhabitants voted ‘yes’. Finally, the political situation that had arisen made it impossible to turn back on the ‘fast 
route’ of art. 151. 
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with a strong sense of being Spanish. This level of ‘dual identity’, reflected in the way in 
which citizens identify themselves, indicates that Andalusians share their institutional 
loyalties at both levels of political legitimacy (national and regional) without any apparent 
fracture between them.  
 
 
Table 3: Andalusian Self-Identification by Andalusians (%) (1986-2002) 
 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 
Only Andalusian 2 7.9 6.7 3.5 1.9 
More Andalusian 
than Spanish 18 13.4 17.4 16.4 12.6 
As Andalusian as 
Spanish 63 44.6 59.5 65.5 70.1 
More Spanish than 
Andalusian 7 11.3 7.3 5.8 7.3 
Only Spanish 7 20.3 8.7 7.6 6.7 
Don’t Know 3 2.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 
Total (N) 4165 621 1825 961 982 
Source: Own elaboration on data from the Spanish Centre of Sociological Research (CIS) for the years 1986, 
1998 and 2002: Studies 1523, 2286, and 2455 respectively. For the years 1990 and 1994 own elaboration from 
Moreno (2001) on data from CIRES. 
 
 
Elements of common ancestry and way of life combine with those of comparative grievances 
in a Comunidad Autónoma traditionally in an economic backward position with respect to 
other Spanish territories. Accordingly, the desire for home rule also combines with the belief 
that the central state must secure inter-regional solidarity and policies to promote economic 
development in Andalusia. The Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) has been the party which has 
managed both of these political discourses. Andalusia is an electoral stronghold for social-
democratic PSOE. Since the first regional elections held in 1982, the PSOE has been the most 
popular party in Andalusia and has consistently controlled the Junta (see Table 4 for the 
evolution of the electoral results).  
 
The influence of Andalusia in national politics, and in particular within the PSOE, is large if 
only for demographic reasons (it is the most populated region in Spain, with more than 7.6 
million inhabitants, and has the largest rank-and-file membership of the Socialist Party). The 
PSOE has been able to win all Andalusian regional elections, including those held during the 
hegemonic period of the conservative Popular Party (PP) in national politics (1996-2004). 
Under the political control of the PSOE, the Junta contested several decisions and policies 
taken by the PP national government. It did so claiming to preserve not only their own 
autonomy, but also with the aim of ideologically challenging central government on matters 
of policy options and political ideas. Indeed, the diverse political colouring of both regional 
and central governments has been a latent motive of confrontation, which sometimes reached 
the level of bitter disagreements. The case of the ‘pending balance’ (deuda histórica) due to 
the Junta by the central treasury, briefly analysed further below, is illustrative in this respect. 
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Table 4: Electoral Results in Andalusia (% popular vote and number of seats) (1982-
2004) 
1982 1986 1990 1994 1996 2000 2004 
 
% 
vote 
 
 
seats 
% 
vote 
 
seats 
% 
vote 
 
seats 
% 
vote 
 
seats 
% 
vote 
 
Seats
% 
vote 
 
seats 
% 
vote 
 
seats 
PSOE 52.64 66 47.19 60 49.79 62 38.90 45 44.23 52 44.79 52 50.27 61 
 
AP/PP 
 
16.99 
 
17 
 
22.29 
 
28 
 
22.30
 
26 
 
34.75
 
41 
 
34.34 40 38.60 
 
46 
 
31.79
 
37 
 
 
PCA-/IULV 
 
8.64 
 
8 
 
17.90 
 
19 
 
12.72
 
11 
 
19.34
 
20 
 
14.11 13 8.21 
 
6 
 
7.51 
 
6 
 
 
UCD/CDS 
 
13.21 
 
15 
 
3.24 ----- 1.19 
 
----- 
 
----- 
 
----- 
 
----- ----- ----- 
 
----- 
 
----- 
 
----- 
 
 
PSA/PA 
 
5.38 
 
3 
 
5.88 
 
2 
 
10.82
 
10 
 
5.86 
 
3 
 
6.74 4 7.56 
 
5 
 
6.19 
 
5 
 
 
TURNOUT 
 
66.53 71.03 55.32 67.68 78.42 69.74 
 
75.85 
 
Parties: 
PSOE: Left-to-centre Spanish Socialist Party. Member of the Party of European Socialists (PES). Socialist Group in 
the European Parliament.  
AP-PP: Conservative AP later transformed into right-to-centre Spanish Popular Party. Member of the European 
People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats. EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament. 
UCD: Centre-right coalition which disappeared after the 1982 General Election. 
CDS: Centrist party created in 1982 by former UCD Prime Minister, Adolfo Suárez. In 1989 it was a member of 
the Group of the European Liberal Democrats and Reform Party (ELDR) in the European Parliament. 
PCA-IULV: Andalusian Communist Party affiliated to the PCE (Spanish Communist Party) and IULV-CA (Left 
coalition of PCE, greens, radical socialists and independent leftists). Member of the Confederal Group of the 
European United Left – Nordic Green Left in the European Parliament. 
PSA-PA: Andalusian Socialist Party (PSA) later transformed into centre-left nationalist Andalusian Party (PA). 
During the period 1999-2004, the representative of the PA in the European Parliament joined the 
Greens/European Free Alliance Group. In 2004, the PA obtained no seat in the European Parliament.  
Source: Own elaboration on data from the Centre of Analysis and Political and Electoral Documentation in 
Andalusia (CADPEA) (cadpea.ugr.es/web/default.aspx). 
 
 
The Andalusian federation of the PSOE embraces federalism, which is the ‘official’ line of 
the Socialist Party but which is not always shared with the same degree of conviction by other 
branch organizations. By controlling a large Spanish Comunidad Autónoma, the Socialists 
have been able to pursue their autonomist philosophy without alienating either ‘centralist’ or 
‘peripheral’ views within the party. Since 1982 the Junta have been able to implement public 
programmes which have enjoyed steady popular support, manifested in the electoral successes 
of the Socialists in all three local, regional and national elections in Andalusia.  
 
 
WELFARE REFORM IN A POORER REGION 
 
The Junta has reinforced its ‘catching up’ attitude in the development of new public polices. 
The traditional neglect of private entrepreneurship in establishing new growth poles in 
Andalusia has had its counterpoint in an active involvement of the Andalusian 
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mesogovernment in attempting to weave a welfare ‘safety net’ in a less prosperous region 
(Fundación La Caixa, 2004). 
 
The Andalusian Statute of Autonomy in its Preliminary Title (art. 12) set the goals to promote 
and to achieve greater welfare levels of the population, to achieve effective gender equality, 
and to support resource equity among social groups. According to art. 13.22 of the 
Andalusian Statute of Autonomy: ‘The Comunidad Autónoma of Andalusia has exclusive 
competence in assistance and social services matters [and] family planning and counselling’. 
Further to their powers in this area, the Junta later assumed the management and organization 
of social services, many of which are within the Spanish Social Security system. 
 
In attempting to develop an integral notion of social welfare, the Andalusian Statute gives 
priority to the social protection of the family. It contemplates the possibility of regulating 
matters like the protection of minors (art. 13.23) and the promotion of activities and services 
for youth and the elderly. It also makes a general reference to community development (art. 
13.30). All these objectives are to be pursued by carrying out ‘long-term’ social policy 
programmes.  
 
Law 2/1988 on Andalusian Social Services aimed at optimising the organization of the 
services and programmes by unifying dispersed units and eliminating duplicated structures. 
The process of organization and unification of the public system of social services was finally 
completed with the establishment of the Secretaryship of Social Affairs (Consejería de 
Asuntos Sociales) in 1990. Since then this Secretaryship has kept its modified denomination 
as Secretaryship for Equality and Social Welfare (Consejería para la Igualdad y Bienestar 
Social). 
 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of welfare expenditure in Andalusia (1988-2004) 
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Source: Own elaboration on data provided by Secretaryship of Economy and Treasury (Consejeria de Economía 
y Hacienda) and the Andalusian Institute of Statistics (IEA). 
 
 
Since 1988, a sustained growth in welfare spending has been noticeable (Figure 1). Those 
increases in social expenditure are congruent with an approach for policy innovation and 
development of public welfare programmes carried out by the Junta. However, such an 
experimental and incremental exercise has not been developed in vacuum. In many cases new 
programmes have been the result of a process of policy learning by which the Junta has made its 
own ‘adaptation’ of programmes already implemented in other Comunidades Autónomas. These 
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have generally kept an eye on each other, and have scrutinized, both formally and informally, the 
running of devolved services and those implemented ex novo. 
 
In the section below, we briefly analyse a new policy, the minimum income scheme. This will 
serve to illustrate the political priorities and functional capabilities of the Junta regarding 
social welfare, although a more detailed and long-term examination of the vicissitudes of the 
programme would be needed in order to assess the extent of its innovative effects.  
 
The Andalusian Minimum Income Scheme (Programa de Solidaridad de los Andaluces)  
 
In 1988, the Spanish central government initiated a period of expansion in welfare spending 
in the non-contributory area. The Social Security system met the costs of the two main 
policies implemented at the time: (a) a generalization of the right to a retirement pension, and 
(b) a disability allowance for people of limited resources and insufficient contributing funds. 
In parallel, regional governments began to develop the programmes of public schemes for 
minimum income guaranteed, known as rentas mínimas de inserción. Local governments 
were in charge of their management. These schemes were designed to facilitate social 
insertion of the poorest and marginal sectors of the population and were implemented in 
almost all the Comunidades Autónomas in a concatenated process between 1988 and 1992. 
The Basque Country was the first to take the initiative, sparking a regional mimesis or 
‘demonstration effect’ on the part of the other sixteen Comunidades Autónomas (Arriba, 
2001).  
 
The Programme of Solidarity for Andalusians (Programa de Solidaridad de los Andaluces) 
was negotiated by the Junta with the main trade unions prior the promulgation of the Decree 
400/1990 (November), later replaced by Decree 2/1999. Since then, the programme has 
operated as a complementary policy of social protection in both the contributory and 
assistance levels. Its ‘workfare’ philosophy is geared towards achieving social insertion for 
needy Andalusian citizens and avoiding a purely assistance character. 
 
The various regional programmes of minimum income have been implemented with roughly 
the same features (combining cash benefits with activities of social insertion). They also 
established common requirements, such as: (a) to have a family as a unit of reference;6 (b) 
means-tested criteria related to a threshold of household income under which cash benefits are 
awarded; (c) to have a residence status for applicants; and, (d) periods of extension are 
available when the beneficiaries have complied with social insertion activities.  
 
Andalusia has not only implemented social services to facilitate access to the system of social 
protection. It has also introduced procedures for promoting social insertion outside the 
framework of social services. Andalusia, Catalonia, Valencia and Madrid started their 
programmes of minimum income one year later than the Basque Country, and they all shared 
the common principle of its interdepartmental management. This approach was in itself an 
innovation and facilitated the common involvement of several regional bodies in offering an 
integral solution to the problem of poverty and exclusion. Andalusia established a set of 
measures in the field of education, occupational training, employment and housing, with the 
                                                 
6 Although one person can form a ‘familiar unit’ when is over 25 years of age and lives in a solo household. In 
the case of Andalusia, family units can have access to minimum income scheme if they have been formed in a 
‘stable form’ at least one year before the request, except for some exceptional cases, and all family members are 
registered in an Andalusian municipality, at least for one year. 
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planning and participation of different regional public bodies (Aguilar, Gaviria and Laparra, 
1995).  
 
 
Table 5: Programme of Solidarity for Andalusians (minimum income scheme)  
(2004, Euro) 
Minimum Wage 2004 (M.W.) 460.50  
Minimum income- Ingreso Mínimo de Solidaridad (62% M.W.) 285.51  
Increase for family member other than the petitioner (8% M.W.) 36.84  
    
Minimum income- Ingreso Mínimo de Solidaridad  
(amounts according to equivalence rates) Monthly Half year 
1 Member 285.51 1,713.06 
2 Members 322.35 1,934.10 
3 Members 359.19 2,155.14 
4 Members 396.03 2,376.18 
5 Members 432.87 2,597.22 
6 Member or more 460.50 2,763.00 
 
Note: Amount established for the year 2004 for the whole of Spain by governmental decree 1,793/2003.  
Source: General Directorate for Social Services and Inclusion (Dirección General de Servicios Sociales, 
Consejería para la Igualdad y Bienestar Social, Junta de Andalucía). 
 
 
Together with the payment of the minimum income benefit (see Table 5), the beneficiary may 
receive occupational training and other programmes monitored by the Secretaryship of 
Labour and Industry (Consejería de Trabajo e Industria). Educational measures for which the 
Secretaryship of Education and Science (Consejería de Educación y Ciencia) is responsible 
include programmes for adult education. A housing subsidy for beneficiaries can reach up to 
90 per cent of the house rental, and monetary support may be awarded for house 
rehabilitation. Achievement of this activity is made possible by the Plan for Neighbourhood 
Preferential Intervention (Plan de Barriadas de Actuación Preferente), aimed at investing in 
urban spaces with serious problems of poverty and deprivation, difficulties in matters of urban 
damages, deterioration of infrastructure, and significant hygienic and sanitary deficiencies. 
However, both occupational training and educational measures have played the main role 
within the Programa de Solidaridad de los Andaluces.  
 
The Programme has had a strong workfare philosophy functioning as a mechanism of 
economic aid by means of temporary jobs directed at the excluded urban population, who 
were not entitled to benefits such as those of the Programme for Rural Employment (Plan de 
Empleo Rural, PER) and the Agrarian Subsidy. Therefore, it has provided more protection to 
needy Andalusians while increasing their opportunities for labour insertion. Temporary jobs 
have usually been subsidized and made available by local authorities on a full-time basis and 
with a six-month duration (Cornejo, 2001).  
 
The final awarding of these benefits is dependent on the signing by the beneficiaries of the 
Commitment of Insertion (Compromiso de Inserción).7 The adult members of the family unit 
must comply with a number of responsibilities concerning the internal life of the household 
                                                 
7 The regional offices responsible for the fulfilment of the Commitment of Insertion are the Provincial 
Delegations of the Secretaryship of Equality and Social Welfare (Delegaciones Provinciales de la Consejería 
para la Igualdad y Bienestar Social), and the municipalities where the beneficiaries reside. 
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and the fulfilment of socio-economic and working obligations of an activation nature. Table 6 
reproduces data concerning the number of beneficiaries during the period 1991-2003.  
 
 
Table 6: Beneficiaries of the Andalusian minimum income scheme (1991-2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Number of beneficiaries 
Years Households  Members   
1991 7,653 26,785 
1992 6,777 23,719 
1993 6,894 24,129 
1994 7,923 27,730 
1995 6,999 24,496 
1996 10,603 37,110 
1997 8,003 28,010 
1998 9,508 33,278 
1999 9,914 34,699 
2000 15,962 55,867 
2001 14,992 52,472 
2002 16,868 59,038 
2003 19,507 68,274 
Note: Family members have been estimated by the Spanish Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs according to 
a mean figure of 3.5 members per household. 
Source: Own elaboration on data provided by the Andalusian Secretaryship of Social Affairs.  
 
 
The Programme of Solidarity (Programa de Solidaridad) can be regarded as rather modest in 
dealing with poverty and social exclusion in Andalusia. However, the importance of this 
programme is crucial for the maintenance of a welfare ‘safety net’ as it is the ‘last resort’ 
public subsidy to which both the poor and the excluded can have access in Andalusia (Arriba, 
2001). Criticisms have been expressed that this type of programmes elaborated and 
implemented under the full responsibility of the Comunidades Autónomas may increase 
regional differences in social spending. An important explanation for policy divergence 
among the various regional minimum income schemes in Spain can be found in the variable 
financial manoeuvrability of the Comunidades Autónomas. The Basque Country and Navarre, 
richer than others, have a system of fiscal quasi-independence which has allowed them to 
generously fund their programmes of rentas mínimas. Despite their economic disadvantage, 
poorer regions have nevertheless been able to design their own areas of intervention for 
accomplishing social insertion.  
 
 
FINANCIAL AUTONOMY AND SPENDING CHOICES 
 
As already stated, policy options and initiatives have been conditioned by the economic 
situation of the second poorest region in Spain, according to per head regional GDP figures 
(see Table 1). In many instances, Andalusia has not reached the desirable minimum level of 
public service provision as proclaimed by the 1978 Constitution for the whole of Spain.8 The 
                                                 
8 According to art. 158, central state budgets must guarantee a common level of basic public services throughout 
the Spanish territory. 
 12
episode of the €2.5 billion ‘pending balance’ (deuda histórica) is illustrative of the difficulties 
of articulating a stable financial settlement for all the Comunidades Autónomas.9  
 
As a consequence of a mismatch in the calculation of the moneys to be transferred to the 
Junta by the central treasury according to a previous system of financing, the sum of €2.5 
billion was in arrears. Both national and regional governments contested the figures although 
the reasons were more ‘political’ than ‘technical’. The issue became a motive of confrontation 
between PP and PSOE on approaching both Andalusian and Spanish elections (which were 
held simultaneously on 15 March, 2004). The Minister of Economy of the PP central 
government stated that the case of the pending payment would be resolved if the PP were to 
win the Andalusian election. Not long after the landslide victory of the PSOE and the heavy 
electoral losses of the PP, the Junta and the central Treasury, whose representatives were 
members of the same Socialist Party, reached an agreement: the pending €2,500 million was 
settled. 
 
Funding for the Andalusian Junta is composed mainly of: (a) shares of the national revenue 
collected by major taxes (since 2002 regional percentages correspond to 33 per cent of income 
tax, 35 per cent of VAT and 40 per cent of special taxes on petrol, tobacco and spirits);10 (b) 
sums accrued by the concession and management of certain taxes (judicial acts and municipal 
taxes, luxury and heritage taxes, inheritance tax and transfers, or gambling taxes); (c) moneys 
from the European funds; and (d) public debt. The funds transferred from the central treasury are 
not categorical or ‘earmarked’ for any service provision. The Comunidades Autónomas have 
freedom of choice about which services and policies under their jurisdiction are to be better 
funded. However, problems of under-budgeting and overspending (or estimating fewer amounts 
in the annual budgets than actual costs) are still a matter of political contention and are becoming 
increasingly contested. 
 
The task of assessing the financial consequences of ‘chronic’ under-budgeting and overspending 
by nationalities and regions is by no means easy. Too often the effects of public borrowing are 
not ‘evident’ at short-term. Only longitudinal studies on extended time series can assess the 
impacts of budget mismatching concerning the survival or modification of policies. Since the 
beginning of the process of decentralization, nationalities and regions have made use of their 
constitutional prerogative to obtain ‘extra’ funds by issuing regional public debt to finance 
policies and services. In some cases these fresh moneys have made possible the financing of new 
programmes. In others, extra financing has been applied to compensate for shortcomings in the 
funding of decentralized services, which eventually became more costly to run because of 
unforeseen reasons (for example, the impact of immigration in health provision expenses).11  
                                                 
9 The claim by the Junta for the ‘deuda histórica’ was grounded in the provision of the 1982 Statute of 
Autonomy recognizing the incapability of Andalusia - due to their socio-economic limitations - to provide a 
minimum level of public services similar to that of the rest of Spain. Equalization amounts were transferred by 
the central treasury (Fondos de Cohesión) to repay the extra financial effort made by the Junta in its annual 
budgets since the 1980s. The question remains rather ‘open’ as resources needed for Andalusia to reach a similar 
level of public service provision to the optimal Spanish mean must take into account not only initial investments 
but future running costs for the maintenance of the programmes. 
10 This ‘basket’ of taxes was strongly supported by the Junta and achieved a complete consensus between the 
central government and the 15 Comunidades Autónomas of the ‘common regime’ at the sectoral conference of 
the Council of Financial and Fiscal Policies (Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera). 
11 Catalonia, Andalusia and Valencia were the ‘early’ Comunidades Autónomas to manage health care some 20 
years ago and are now heavily indebted. In Catalonia the deficit runs annually at a pace of €600 million. Despite 
the prerogative to surcharge up to 2.4 centimes the price of a litre of car fuel to finance health care, the 
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In some instances the Comunidades Autónomas have attempted to display ‘blame avoidance’ 
practices and to divert their own responsibilities by portraying the central state as a ‘scapegoat’ 
of their own failures; in other circumstances, central administration officials have referred 
(usually ‘off-the-record’) to the insufficient skills of regional policy-makers. In such a process of 
mutual indictments, popular ‘understanding’ has generally sympathized with the regional claims, 
while central managers have usually struggled with the reputation of being inheritors of a 
centralist mentality characteristic of the former dictatorship (Solé Tura, 1985; Moreno, 2004). 
 
Not surprisingly, the priority that the Junta has placed in reforming the Statute of Autonomy 
relates to the achievement of the so-called ‘Andalusian fiscal space’ (espacio fiscal propio).12 
This request implies normative powers and full capacity for the management of tax collection 
with the establishment of the Tax Agency of Andalusia (Agencia Tributaria de Andalucía). The 
agency would be in charge of fiscal matters and would make more visible the ‘co-responsibility’ 
of Andalusian authorities in optimising resources of control, not only to combat fraud, but also to 
promote transparency and popular legitimacy for regional policies. 
 
Although in a loose manner, this option of finance settlement would be one of ‘tributary 
confederation’ along the lines of those enjoyed by Navarre and the Basque Country. That is to 
say, the Comunidades Autónomas would collect most of the taxes and would then pay the state 
previously agreed sums or quotas for the general state budget. This possibility appears desirable 
insofar as it would be clearer for the citizens to assess expenditure responsibilities by 
mesogovernments of the Comunidades Autónomas. However, it would also require greater 
specification where the principle of solidarity is concerned, in the form of explicit transfer 
requirements between rich and poor communities (Moreno, 2001). 
 
In line with a pro-active approach to policy-making based upon a ‘catching up’ stance, the Junta 
aims at achieving the ‘maximum degree of financial autonomy’ (Presidencia de la Junta, 2003; 
9/4). As happened in the past, the Junta is not prepared to accept any asymmetrical arrangement 
with other Comunidades Autónomas which could be seen as a ‘privilege’. Furthermore, the 
emphasis is put by the Junta on the use of updated and ‘real’ population as the main criterion to 
be taken into account for the calculation of the sharing of state revenue. Andalusia is the most 
populated Comunidad Autónoma with 17.8% of the Spanish total (see Table 1). 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
During the last 25 years, Spain has undergone a widespread process of political 
decentralization and home-rule-all-round. The level of self-government reached by the 
Spanish Comunidades Autónomas is high as compared with most of the decentralized 
countries in the world. At the beginning of the process of devolution, the quest of Andalusia 
to achieve a similar degree and level of self-government as the ‘historical nationalities’ 
brought about a further stimulus to self-government in the rest of the Spanish regions. Such a 
development set in motion a general process of mimesis by other Comunidades Autónomas, 
which entered a ‘race to the top’ with each other in order to gain as many decentralized 
powers as possible.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Generalitat was expected to collect €60 million in 2004, just 10% of the forecast deficit (El País, 13 September, 
2004). 
12 Manuel Chaves, President of the Junta, has proposed a debate in the Andalusian Parliament which could also 
deal with the issue of the ‘horizontal’ participation of Andalusia in the state-wide decision making, the writing of 
a bill of social rights and the territorial planning of the Comunidad Autónoma. 
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In the welfare field of public provision, the Andalusian Junta has implemented a number of 
new policies which have contributed to consolidate its institutional legitimacy and to reinforce 
a strong regionalist political agenda. In parallel, this Comunidad Autónoma, where a strong 
sense of common identity and a mutual sense of belonging are widely shared, has also 
continued to count on the ‘umbrella’ of non-discriminatory provisions guaranteed by the 
Spanish 1978 Constitution. 
 
Financial settlement for the funding of new policies by the Junta continues to be a matter of 
dispute. Of crucial importance for the financing of new welfare programmes is the establishment 
of what the Junta has labelled its ‘own fiscal space’ (espacio fiscal propio). This would 
guarantee a percentage share of the major national taxes which would form a ‘basket’ providing 
a stable and reliable fiscal autonomy to Andalusia. The limit to such fiscal powers would be 
reflected in the maintenance of the social security system on a nation-wide basis.  
 
Decentralization of the Spanish welfare state has stimulated regional policy innovation, with a 
‘demonstration effect’ that, so far, has minimised the detrimental consequences for state-
national solidarity. Assessment of policy outcomes, as those innovative programmes carried 
out by the Junta, should also be considered and scrutinized over longer time periods. Such an 
analytical exercise is crucial to evaluating not only the compliance of policy goals, but also 
levels of legitimacy and popular support for regional autonomy. 
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